http://mitworld.mit.edu/ MIT World media in category 'National Security'. en-us Tue, 24 Nov 2009 20:29:20 GMT Tue, 30 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/682 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/682 While Barack Obama has rejected the Bush administration’s harsh stance toward Iran, panelists warn that we’re far from the start of fruitful relations, and that achieving real diplomacy will paradoxically require both patience and a sense of urgency.

Suzanna DiMaggio observes the U.S. seeking “areas of common interest and managing areas of profound differences” with Iran, moving “well beyond a change in language” to concrete and profound shifts in policy, such as recognizing Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program; curtailing support for Iranian opposition groups; and reaching out for Iran’s cooperation on Afghanistan. DiMaggio says Afghanistan may prove key to building the foundations of a relationship, since Iran is concerned about halting the spread of violent fundamentalism and curtailing drug trafficking. The way forward, she suggests, involves approaching Iran in a “direct and sustained way to clarify U.S. intentions in the region while building confidence and trust,” which “will require each side to exercise great restraint,” and an acceptance that there will be frequent setbacks.

Jim Walsh describes recent U.S. actions toward Iran as “scene setting,” with such moves as dropping preconditions for discussing Iran’s nuclear program, and discouraging Israel from contemplating a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But “Iran is cautious,” with its government demonstrating “a certain schizophrenia” -- hopefulness and curiosity about Barack Obama, but skepticism about the U.S. pursuing substantive change. Tactical cooperation with Iran around Afghanistan and the drug trade appears to Walsh a better starting point for discussions than Iran’s nuclear program. He says, “Barack Obama may speak with a nicer tone, offer greater incentives, but if at the end of the day, he insists on no centrifuges, we will end up at the same outcome as before.” Substantial movement will take months, and all the while, Iran will continue to build centrifuges. Walsh sees a dilemma for the president: he must attempt to build confidence by moving slowly, but the “best chance for success is if Obama acts early and boldly while he still has the power of public opinion behind him domestically and internationally…It won’t last forever.

Stephen Heintz points out that “Iran is in the center of a set of issues of direct national interest to the U.S.,” including Middle East peace, the war on terror, regional stability and oil. The problem is that in trying to find points of intersection with Iran, each nation “has very little knowledge of the other,” as well as bad memories (the hostage crisis of 1979, the U.S. support of the Shah). This “only reinforces a relationship based on suspicion.” While Barack Obama “has done a superb job at creating different atmospherics,” there is a huge debate underway within policy circles, as different groups jockey to shape Iran policy. Heintz doesn’t expect much movement until after the Iranian elections, but hopes that the restart of multilateral talks, and discussions about regional security and drug trade will help free both nations of the “paranoia and fear” that’s built up over time. ]]> Fri, 20 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/647 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/647 These five security specialists seem dubious about major Defense Department reforms as the Obama administration winds into action.

Cindy Williams first unloads these basics: the U.S. FY 2009 Department of Defense non-war budget is over half a trillion dollars – “about as much money as the rest of the world combined spends on their military endeavors;” another $200 billion is going to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military is the nation’s and possibly the world’s largest employer, with 1.4 million active duty men and women and another million plus in the guard, reserves and civilian side. But in spite of this manpower and budget, says Williams, “the Secretary of Defense will face daunting constraints,” from the current economic meltdown, to the looming entitlement deficit posed by baby boomer retirement. Williams also notes a set of pressures driving costs skyward, not least of which include the likelihood of global conflicts springing up.

There’s a “popular parlor game in D.C.,” says Owen Coté, of tracking “elaborate, often baroque programs that are over budget, to figure out which will be canceled.” To Coté’s thinking, “dozens of programs fit into that category.” Complicating this “game” is a tug of war among the different services. The perception, says Coté, is of “a zero-sum fight for resources between the Army and Marine Corps, and the Navy and Air Force on the other hand.” Yet all our forces must prepare for both irregular warfare (military operations that don’t involve states), and traditional wars against nations with militaries. The simplest approach to Defense program allocations, Coté says, “is to decide what kinds of wars we think we’re going to fight, and what is the relevance of the program in one of these kinds of wars. If it doesn’t look relevant to either, I’ve got some candidates to help you save money.”

“I don’t think much new will happen in the new administration,” says Harvey Sapolsky. “It helps that Republicans started a big, messy war.” But Sapolsky is worried about “continuities,” including the U.S. “propensity to intervene internationally,” “exploitation of our gullibility about management systems,” and “wishful thinking about inter-organizational agency coordination.” We’re fortunately “out of troops” to do interventions he says, but he imagines we’ll still find ourselves “in the thick of it unnecessarily.” He wishes there could be a “moratorium on management fads in DOD,” the endless discussion of achieving reforms when “defense is inherently an inefficient enterprise.”

William Fallon sees a mountain of DOD “desirements,” stemming from an endless “to-do list of things people want done in the name of security.” Well-intended outsiders, from Congress to the general public, press for new weapons programs, and military interventions. We “have a phenomenal budget, filled with all kinds of things, that if you lay them out, you’re probably hard-pressed to find a connection between that line item and national security.” Nevertheless, “despite all the hand wringing, inefficiencies and angst, overall, security for the country stands in pretty darn good shape.” ]]> Mon, 05 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/630 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/630 “I’ve drunk kava in the South Pacific and rubbed noses with natives,” says William Fallon. “I’ve enjoyed tender baby camel as a delicacy. I’ve met presidents, kings, prime ministers and many ordinary folks. I’ve done a lot of things. That was yesterday. What matters is today and tomorrow.” Now, says Fallon, is the time for all Americans to get down to business addressing the key crises confronting them. And he does mean ordinary Americans, not just the next president.

As a naval man with 45 years of experience dealing with conflicts all over the world, Fallon figures that the major challenges facing the nation will be at minimum “daunting,” but they are not beyond our collective capability. There’s the financial crisis; nuclear and other threats from Iran, North Korea and wide-ranging terror organizations; the competition for resources and the issue of climate change; and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. All these issues are global, and increasingly interconnected, notes Fallon, and addressing them will require “close cooperation with other nations.”

The problem is that the U.S. has lost much credibility internationally in recent years, says Fallon, and so our leaders will have to reestablish the trust and confidence the rest of the world once had in our country. While top politicians can begin a process of diplomacy and cooperative engagements with other nations, Fallon thinks it’s equally or more important for ordinary Americans “to get our domestic house in order.” He’s of the opinion that the individual behaviors of Americans “have contributed to a general malaise,” and only by addressing these on an individual basis will our nation be able “to reestablish its prestige and influence for the betterment of a very interdependent world.”

Fallon focuses on the U.S. education system, which apart from world class universities like MIT, “wallows in underperformance … releasing millions of alleged graduates who can neither read nor write, understand math beyond elementary levels, find any place on a map….” Add to this “mediocrity” the fact that Americans feed their “self-indulgence in personal material goods” while starving such critical infrastructure as bridges and roads, which enable daily activities. Our critics rightly view us as “increasingly self-centered and heedless of the interests of others,” notes Fallon. It’s time to set our priorities straight. The U.S. has the “human capital, traditional values and the immense resources to take on and fix any of these problems.” What remains is the “willingness to do the job. Let’s get going,” he concludes. ]]> Tue, 14 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/605 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/605 After tuning in closely to the presidential campaign, these panelists don’t discern worlds of difference in the candidates’ approaches to foreign policy. But the speakers convey key concerns and offer words of advice to the next U.S. president.

Barry Posen is interested in the future of U.S. grand strategy, by which he means our plan for achieving and maintaining security and power. Thus far, says Posen, both presidential candidates “largely share the same view on U.S. grand strategy,” which is very expansive, with “a long, global agenda for U.S. security goals.”

Both sides agree on the continued struggle against terror, containment of rogue states, and a commitment to the spread of democracy. Their disagreements are “tactical, though not trivial,” involving for instance the relevance of international institutions, and the role of diplomacy. Posen worries that both campaigns “overlook key problems in U.S. post-Cold War strategy or offer facile answers.” Money is a big problem: we’ve been financing military ventures with so much borrowed money that Posen wonders if our power position in the world hasn’t been diminished. The candidates “tend to talk about national security policy as if there are no resource constraints,” and if the next president adopts the same unfettered approach, the U.S. risks provoking other nations -- pushing them to act recklessly and build up their militaries. Candidates must join the issue of “whether or not we need to make tradeoffs between solving problems at home and slaying dragons abroad.”

Carol Saivetz worries that the next president will usher in a new cold war with Russia. The past eight years have led to a steady erosion of U.S.-Russian relations. When Putin came to power, he “wanted to play in the old boy’s club,” but met with a series of “perceived and real humiliations,” from NATO expansion to Kosovo. Because “Russia is a superpower wanna be,” says Saivetz, the next president must “craft serious policy towards Russian and not just knee-jerk reactions.”

Toward that end, Saivetz recommends the new administration develop a consistent and even tone of discourse with the Russians; keep them in international institutions but “reign them in tightly;” work with Russia on all issues where there’s a commonality of interests, such as terrorism; make room for Russia in the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program; and if U.S. missile defense must go on in Europe, at least give the Russians access to sites. “We must stop this tit for tat retail,” she says, noting Russia’s new interest in Venezuela. The next president must “pull back from the edge; it sounds like Cuba.”

The candidates are not really discussing Asia, says Taylor Fravel, but they are surprisingly similar in what they do say. He describes a set of challenges to the next administration, including handling the evolving crisis with North Korea’s nuclear program; maintaining stability in Taiwan and Chinese relations; achieving a climate change agreement with China; engaging multilateral institutions like ASEAN rather than bilateral military agreements; and “coping with and accommodating China’s rise.” ]]> Sun, 07 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/590 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/590 Greg Mitchell has found both comedy and tragedy in the shameless and near-universal complicity between the American press and the Bush Administration around the Iraq war and occupation. Mitchell’s amply documented account of the run-up to the invasion through the recent surge forms the basis of his new book, So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits and the President Failed on Iraq, and this talk.

The nation’s mainstream media flunked a basic test of journalism, according to Mitchell: displaying a healthy skepticism. “Even if you’re reporting for a tiny newspaper in Topeka, and interviewing the local garbage department official, don’t take what he says as gospel. Check it out with other people.” From the multiple rationales offered by the Bush Administration for the invasion, to their progress reports on the occupation, the news media gobbled up the official line, hook and sinker, as Mitchell recounts in detail.

Some examples from the early days: newspaper pieces about Colin Powell’s “slam dunk” case at the U.N. establishing Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions, which proved to be a complete sham. Mitchell says, “If the press is still around 200 years from now, this will be in the text books.” And there’s The New York Times’ Judy Miller searching with the military to find weapons of mass destruction, which also “turned out to be bogus.” Americans bought, and according to polls, continue to believe, the Bush Administration’s linkage of Iraq to 9/11, and to Al Qaeda. “Whether this is the media’s fault, or the American people’s lack of interest…the media didn’t push the truth strongly enough,” says Mitchell.

In the five years following “mission accomplished” Mitchell finds a recurring theme of media self-censorship around using graphic images of war and documenting the grisly details, whether of Americans flown home in coffins, veterans suffering from physical and mental injuries, or civilian deaths in Iraq. He notes that in spite of mounting evidence that war efforts were foundering, no major newspaper came out for a change of course in Iraq.

This hasn’t ended, even with a majority of Americans against the war. The “media went sleepwalking into an abyss” when Bush enacted his plan for the surge. What’s worse, there’s a new absence of coverage, with attention focused on the economy and elections, and the threat of Iran. With the media neglecting the pursuit of truth, Mitchell worries that the relevance of mainstream journalism is fading, replaced by opinion-based blogs and partisan websites. ]]> Thu, 07 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/522 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/522 Human rights are central to the fraught politics between Israelis and Palestinians, these two panelists argue. Any conceivable solution to such an endless conflict must begin by acknowledging the current bleak realities of Palestinian life under Israeli rule, they say.

Anat Biletzki and the group B'Tselem have conducted painstaking studies of how Israel’s longstanding agenda of allowing its civilians to settle on Palestinian occupied land constitutes an infringement of the Palestinians’ basic equality, property rights, freedom of movement, their very “right to self-determination.” The settlements were given a “cloak of legality,” sanctioned as they were by one Israeli government after another. Geographically, the settlements break up what might have been a contiguous Palestinian state.

Biletzki ties the settlements together with other work by the Israelis conducted in the name of security to demonstrate the existence of a forbidding, two-tier society : a system of roads off limits to Palestinians in the occupied territories, or permitted only via carefully guarded checkpoints; the wall (or separation barrier), which runs through Palestinian land; and the total control of Gaza, from the economy to communications, which increasingly makes it “a big prison.” This barricading of Palestinians has become a “routine phenomenon” –and not worthy of the headlines, in the way bombs and torture are, says Biletzki. She insists that “our political conversation must become a human rights conversation,” and hopes that she can make an impact on American Jews and policy makers, who don’t believe in the possibility of making a deal with the Palestinians: “If we give them the land, they’ll throw us into the sea.”

Jeff Halper describes the current situation for Palestinians as apartheid, knowing full well the awful resonance of the term. He sees the system of settlements, roads and the wall as a deliberate land grab, “imprisoning tens of thousands of Palestinians within cities, towns and villages.” The word apartheid “cuts through -- immediately you get it.” This is important because the situation in Israel “is a global issue that affects everyone. It’s the epicenter of instability in the entire region…one of the reasons you can’t take toothpaste onto an airplane.”

Reframing the issue will bring the kind of negative attention that South Africa once drew, as well as international sanctions, and corporate divestment. While Halper believes Israel has essentially foreclosed a viable two-state solution, he still imagines that the U.S. might persuade Israel to pull out of the settlements, so Palestinians can move back in. “There would be dancing in the streets of Tel Aviv,” Halper predicts, because so many Israelis “want this albatross off their back.” ]]> Thu, 27 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/510 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/510 It’s time to trade in the Department of Homeland Security for a Department of Homeland Vulnerabilities, says Charles Perrow. At its peril, our nation “privileges terrorism over natural and industrial disasters.”

From Perrow’s perspective, the U.S. landscape is riddled with “weapons of mass destruction:” chemical plants; vital infrastructure such as bridges and levees; aging nuclear power plants; large, centralized providers of energy, water and food, all of which are obvious targets for natural disasters, accidents or attack. “There are 123 locations in our nation where a vapor cloud released by an accident or terror attack could endanger over 1 million people,” says Perrow. Freight trains loaded with poisons lumber through our cities every day. With global warming, storms, floods and fires are on the increase. And the internet is “held hostage to Microsoft’s command of 90% of the operating systems that we use.” This means hackers with malicious intent could subvert sensitive facilities like our power grid and infiltrate the U.S. military.

We can’t prevent and mitigate our way out of this fix, no matter what administration is in office, says Perrow, although he bemoans the enormous erosion of regulatory oversight during the Bush era. He proposes instead such steps as removing hazardous materials from major population centers; dispersing vulnerable populations; breaking up or decentralizing large organizations; and codifying these measures through stringent laws. This approach won’t likely win him friends in places like New Orleans, a city he hopes will not spring back to its pre-Katrina size. Cities in risky areas should be downsized, and provided with multiple evacuation routes and redundant means of protection and emergency services. “If we rely only on a few, we will be in peril.”

He takes aim at defenders of big organizations, who say we need economies of scale to function in a global economy. “Bigger is not safer,” says Perrow. The larger the manufacturing plant, or internet service network, the more concentrated the power, the more likely an accident of consequence is to take place. We need many smaller, interconnected facilities, which can provide adequate economic efficiency. Perrow cites some “baby steps” in the right direction -- laws mandating public disclosure and inventories of hazardous materials and processes, and the switch by manufacturers to less poisonous substances. But real results “all depend on politics.” ]]> Sat, 27 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/488 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/488 The authors of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy caused a sensation on the Beltway and on campuses across the U.S. Here they walk a respectful MIT audience through their argument that Israel does not deserve unconditional support from the U.S.

Stephen Walt builds a case that a special relationship exists between the U.S. and Israel, involving billions of dollars’ worth of economic and military aid. This support, amounting to $500 per year for each Israeli citizen, comes even when Israel is doing things the U.S. opposes. Walt claims this relationship derives primarily from the influence of a powerful, pro-Israel lobby -- a loose coalition of individuals and groups, he is careful to say, not a cabal. This lobby functions openly to influence U.S. policy to favor Israel and has enough clout, he says “to help drive politicians from office who are considered ineffective” on Israel issues, as well as “shape public discourse so Israel is viewed favorably by most Americans.” Critics of Israel’s actions typically find themselves branded anti-Semitic “and marginalized in the public arena.” Walt points out various examples of blackballing, including abrupt cancellations in his own book tour, as evidence of the lobby’s impact.

This U.S.-Israel relationship, says John Mearsheimer, threatens the national interest of both nations. Hostility toward the U.S. among Arab states has only deepened since the 1967 war, as the U.S. protects Israel in the U.N., and ignores Israeli expansion on Palestinian lands. This resentment is fueling terrorism, including 9/11, Mearsheimer claims. Bin Laden was “deeply concerned with the plight of Palestinians since he was a young man. …The notion of payback for injustices suffered by the Palestinians is powerfully recurrent in his speeches.” Now, the Iraq war -- “one of the worst strategic blunders in American history,” says Mearsheimer -- has helped solidify anger against the U.S. and Israel among Arab nations. Mearsheimer believes that along with Washington’s neoconservatives, “Israel and the lobby were two of the main driving forces behind the decision to invade Iraq.” It’s time for the U.S. to treat Israel like other democracies, and to reward Israel when it behaves “in ways consistent with the U.S. national interest,” and to “use leverage to change Israel’s behavior…”

Respondent Bruce Riedel believes these arguments “oversimplify complex situations.” As a confessed member of the Israel lobby, as well as an intimate party to several rounds of Middle East peace talks, Riedel asserts that “neither Israel nor its supporters in the U.S. were a juggernaut always getting what they wanted nor unconditional help.” In particular, he disputes that Israel pushed for a war with Iraq: “Israel stood on the sidelines and said you got the wrong ‘IRA’ country, you should go after the other one.” He also says that while Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians have alienated most of the Muslim world, the policy issue for these countries is not how much of Gaza or the West Bank Israel should give back, but American support for the very existence of Israel. ]]> Tue, 17 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/465 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/465 The Bush administration’s panic about failing in Iraq is now driving its fierce attitude toward Iran, according to Kenneth Pollack. President Bush’s 2007 State of the Union message hinted at exercising military force to deal with an Iran it accused of stoking up insurgency in Iraq. Pollack points out that historically, this administration tends to point the finger at others when its strategy proves faulty. Not that long ago, the U.S. suggested Saddam Hussein was behind all the Middle East’s problems, says Pollack, and then when we removed him, “bizarrely, the problems didn’t go away.” So now, the U.S. accuses Iran of sending deadly explosive devices into Iraq, killing Americans and obstructing reconstruction efforts there.

This “knee-jerk and customary response of saber rattling” is contrary to our best interests not just in Iraq, says Pollack, but in the monumental effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There are steps the U.S. must take if it hopes to avoid an even greater Middle Eastern debacle. Pollack suggests a change in tack, and tone, by pursuing rational diplomatic initiatives. The U.S., says Pollack, should ask Iran to use its influence in Iraq to diminish the mayhem there -- and offer the Iranians something in return. Spell out positive goals, and provide incentives, he suggests.

And while engaged in a dialogue around Iraq, continue with international allies to apply economic pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Pollack points out that Iran’s economy “continues to do poorly at a time when oil money is flooding its coffers, causing popular unhappiness.” If starved of foreign capital, Iran may be forced to choose between an expensive nuclear weapons program and salvaging its economy. When North Korea chose nuclear weapons, three million people starved, recalls Pollack. Iran is unlikely to make the same decision. So “slowly turn up the heat” while offering to help jumpstart a new, high tech-based economy.

Most important, Pollack hammers home, is that the Bush administration lose the bellicose rhetoric – i.e., stop “intoning its mantra of ‘all options are on the table.’” Hardliners in Iran welcome the opportunity to cast the U.S. as an unfair bully intent on keeping Iran weak. The administration seems to be looking for ways to rescue its legacy from the debacle of Iraq. Its only hope is by dropping aggressive rhetoric and “rediscovering diplomacy,” including the use of rewards and bartering, says Pollack. The administration has not been known for “subtlety and patience,” concludes Pollack, so Iran may prove to be the acid test for a genuine attempt at diplomacy. ]]> Wed, 27 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/458 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/458 If nuclear energy becomes a central tool in addressing climate change, will nuclear weapons proliferation inevitably follow? In the words of Matthew Bunn, “The horse ain’t entirely out of the barn—there are still things to do.” He and fellow panelists acknowledge the link between civilian nuclear energy programs and military use of the atom, but try to find a middle ground, where technical and institutional roadblocks prevent the spread of deadly weapons to nations and terrorists.

For starters, Bunn recommends tackling the hard-core cases, Iran and North Korea. If they became established nuclear nations, they would present “a huge blow to the non-proliferation regime.” Give them a “package of multilateral carrots and sticks large and credible enough” to convince them to drop their pursuit of weapons, Bunn suggests. He also advocates reducing demand for nuclear weapons “through alliances that extend a defense umbrella, resolving regional conflicts and granting more status to non-nuclear weapons states;” beefing up verification, inspection, and enforcement, with more access to sites; and preventing future black market networks from arising. He describes a chilling number of nuclear material thefts, and suggests that international sabotage of a reactor is more likely than a safety accident, so the nuclear industry should “bring its worst security performers up to level.”

In 1945, as a grade school student, Marvin Miller remembers singing “a hymn of praise to the bomb in school assembly.” While the public regarded it as the weapon that won World War 2, Miller, in his history of the early post-war period, recalls that many scientists and statesmen were both hopeful of the promise of nuclear power, and deeply concerned about proliferation and an arms race. In March 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal report warned that international inspections would not be enough to prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear facilities, and recommended a central, international authority monitor and control uranium enrichment, mining and the production of plutonium. The world wasn’t ready for such a solution then, says Miller. Is it ready for it now? Miller believes that U.S. national security and international stability are best served “by taking concrete steps toward a nuclear weapons-free world.”

The non-proliferation treaty has become outmoded, says Geoff Forden. It is basically a bargain between nations in the atomic club, who promise access to peaceful nuclear technology to nations outside the club, if those without weapons pledge not to pursue them. But with the globalization of precision engineering and sophisticated manufacturing techniques, there are no longer barriers to acquiring nuclear know-how and materials. Nuclear profiteers such as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, have also provided a fast track to nuclear systems. So “we should proceed with a new philosophy,” says Forden, increasing international involvement in every country’s nuclear programs -- including intrusive inspections, and an international auditing authority to monitor letters of credit exchanged electronically. Forden also proposes placing an international enrichment facility on Iranian soil, allowing that nation access to nuclear fuel through “black box” technology that won’t permit theft of material or engineering. In exchange, Iran would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. ]]> Mon, 14 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/447 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/447 Nuclear energy will emerge either as a solution to the twin crises of global warming and a secure energy supply, or global catastrophe. Within this panel at least, there doesn’t seem to be a comfortable middle ground.

MIT’s Andrew Kadak, one of the two speakers arguing the necessity of nuclear energy, advances the policy recommendations formulated by a group of fellow researchers. Given the fact of global warming, we must admit a “second inconvenient truth,” says Kadak -- that all non-CO2 emitting energy sources must be used, and to make a real difference in the near term, we must turn first and foremost to nuclear energy and conservation.

Right now, 20% of U.S. electricity flows from nuclear power stations, but there have been no new orders for plants since 1975. The current administration hopes to spur interest, through its Energy Policy Act of 2005, which sets up tax credits for building new power plants. With the help of sophisticated new plant designs and an activated Yucca Mountain repository for spent fuel -- all potentially coming together in the next few years -- Kadak believes utilities and investors will accept the high costs of construction. This will be more likely if government puts in place a carbon tax, which will make fossil fuel costs higher, eventually evening the playing field for nuclear power.

Victor Reis lays out three potential policies: nuclear phase-out, growing nuclear power without recycling, and growing nuclear power with recycling. He dismisses the first because “phase-out alone will inevitably lead to expansion of U.S. coal-burning plants,” and reduce the nation’s leadership role in shaping global nuclear policy. The second policy depends on stowing enormous quantities of nuclear waste underground, which means as more plants come on line, there won’t be enough storage: “Think of opening up another Yucca every 3-4 years.”

Reis and the Bush Administration advocate an alternative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which hopes to deploy new laboratory-based methods of recycling plutonium fuel, and eliminating deadly byproducts that could potentially be used by terrorists. GNEP also calls for an international fuel leasing protocol, where other countries get to use the recycled nuclear fuel. The waste produced is much reduced in this scheme, so a single Yucca Mountain would likely suffice.

Allison Macfarlane casts a skeptical eye on the concept of expanded nuclear power as key in the short term to addressing climate change. It costs too much and takes too long to build new plants, she says -- why wouldn’t investors rather plunk their money down for natural gas plants, which are a fraction the cost and take just two years to build? Macfarlane’s larger concerns involve the vast amounts of waste produced by current light water reactors. Thirty to forty tons of spent fuel sits in pools at reactors, she says, vulnerable to tampering. As for Yucca Mountain, Macfarlane notes, “There is no waste repository for spent fuel or high level nuclear waste open. This is in an industry that’s been around for 50 years, and that should give us pause.” The waste problem simply isn’t very tractable from a political or technical perspective. If there’s a large nuclear power expansion, Macfarlane believes, it won’t happen here or in Europe, but in Asia and other developing countries, which means a proliferation issue, since “the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons atom are basically the same.” ]]> Wed, 09 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/445 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/445 Joseph Cirincione delivers an energetic and at times impassioned primer on the standoff with Iran on its nuclear program, drawn in part from his latest book, The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, Spring 2007).

He offers a succinct ‘equation’ to describe what drives nations to acquire nuclear weapons: 3P+T+E, where power (security), prestige, politics (domestic), technology and economics combine in various ways to tip a nation toward joining the nuclear club. If one or more of these factors can be blunted somehow – for instance, through economic or political incentives, or preventing the free flow of fissile material and technology – then nuclear-inclined nations may be persuaded to change course.

The current tense situation with Iran throws such drivers into vivid relief. Cirincione first notes that Iran’s nuclear weapons development began under the U.S.-installed Shah, who was to be our “gendarme in the Gulf.” His program had the backing of many of today’s key U.S. political figures, including Vice President Cheney. After the 1979 revolution, Iranian leaders continued the program, acquiring technology from Pakistan, to counter Iraq, which had its own weapons program, and which invaded Iran in the early 80s. One million Iranians died in this war, and no one came to their aid, says Cirincione. “Iranians remember they were alone. You have to understand history to understand why Iran may want nuclear weapons now.”

But in a twist, Cirincione hypothesizes that Iran did not get far with its nuclear development and that it doesn’t currently have a secret weapons program. While Iran maintains it has the right to acquire nuclear technology, it won’t admit to its past weapons work. That would “blow their whole story line, that it’s against Islam to have nuclear weapons.” So they stall international inspections and hope “by obfuscation and delay they can drag out the issue, and the world will acquiesce to their plans.”

With Iran insisting on moving ahead with uranium enrichment, what are the options? Cirincione takes aim at the current U.S. default policy, “to muddle through.” He also scoffs at the idea of regime change in Iran, since Iraq teaches that “democratic transformation takes a long time.” He saves his most poisonous barbs for U.S. neoconservatives, who are hatching military plans to sweep through Iran. “This is nuts,” says Cirincione, a strategy driven by people with “messianic impulses” who perceive “one great Islamo-fascist threat.” Iran could respond to attack by shutting down oil traffic, or attacking U.S. servicemen in Iraq; rage in the Islamic world “would put at risk American economic, political and cultural institutions worldwide.” Plus, Iranians “would go pedal to the metal to get a bomb as quickly as they could.”

The alternative, says Cirincione, is to contain and engage: expand harsh sanctions against Iran and create fractures among Iranian political factions. We “back them into a corner, then give them a way out,” says Cirincione. “Negotiations aren’t appeasement, they’re statecraft. We should be having direct discussions with Iran.” ]]> Mon, 17 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/295 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/295
Even if the U.S. draws the right lessons from Hurricane Katrina, panelists suggest, the nation may still be caught short in the next disaster.

In some areas of government, Kenneth Oye points out, “weaknesses can go on for a long time because you don’t confront a reality test. Katrina was a reality test with implications for (FEMA) that could not be ignored.” This agency had functioned quite well in prior administrations, he continues, having learned from mistakes following Hurricane Andrew more than a decade ago. But then came 9/11 and the incorporation of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security. Says Oye, “With its (new) focus on terrorism, middle management people with experience in natural disasters left, and were replaced with patronage appointments…It became a hollow agency.” Oye worries about disasters “not in the play book, where we project and guess” such as nuclear or biological terrorism.

Richard Larson grades the effectiveness of responses to such disasters as the Oklahoma City bombing, the Tokyo subway sarin attack, the Bhopal gas explosion, and summarizes some lessons from these experiences: preposition supplies and equipment; anticipate lots of volunteers and off-duty personnel, and set up rules for their deployment; implement “data trawling” of 911 calls in case “independent reports turn out to be really one massive thing;” reduce traffic congestion on phones and radios; and expect tradeoffs around evacuation decisions. But, notes Larsen, “as important as an improved hurricane response is, it’s probably more important to think about the next flu pandemic.”

Yossi Sheffi has seen organizations splutter and fail after catastrophe strikes. The British government’s initial response to a 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease made things worse, he recalls. When it “closed its entire countryside to instill confidence, the damage to tourism was 2.5 times the damage to the agricultural sector.” This kind of overreaction is typical of high impact, low probability events, says Sheffi, so “developing resilience to withstand big shocks is an organizational issue.” Just as many global corporations build redundancy in inventory, and beef up communications and security, national prevention must involve “process tightening” and investing in infrastructure, from achieving energy independence to shoring up leaky water supplies. “Prepare for the next one, not the last one,” Sheffi counsels. “It won’t be coming with three days warning next time.”

]]> Tue, 26 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/279 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/279 Somehow Arnold Barnett manages to massage the subject of airline accidents into a breezy and sometimes comforting talk on statistical probabilities. In decades of research, he has taken firm hold of the metrics of measuring mortality in flight. While there are many ways of looking at the grim numbers, Barnett has developed his own preferred ratio, which looks at “death risk per randomly chosen flight.” Applying this approach, Barnett has come up with very reassuring statistics: The death risk per flight on first world domestic jet services, for the period of 1990-1999, was 1 in 13 million. To the air averse, Barnett offers that “a citizen is 2.5 times as likely to win the jackpot of the Massachusetts state lottery as to perish on his or her next flight.” For the four years between 2000 and 2004, there were zero accidental deaths in 70 million first world flights. Airline safety has tangibly improved, says Barnett. But security is another matter entirely: “We lost it all on a Tuesday in September,” he says. While we’ve “brought accidents to the brink of extinction”, we haven’t solved our problems “dealing with the forces of evil.” He strongly urges the reintroduction of positive passenger-baggage match, which he believes will deter terrorists who may use flawed explosive detection devices “as roulette wheels.”

As for fixing the Electoral College, which he likens to tilting at windmills, Barnett proposes applying a weighted average. This would “all but eliminate the worse consequences of the winner take all rule.” The biggest drawback? “People have difficulty with mathematical ideas. And this sounds complicated.” ]]> Wed, 29 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/224 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/224 The events of 9/11 unleashed a flood of security measures across all dimensions of daily life, many of them aimed at averting repeat attacks on aircraft. So you might imagine that the risks of flying have been much reduced. You’d be wrong, says Arnold Barnett, who has scrutinized the changes in air security regulations, and found them wanting. The cost of another airplane attack, to the airline industry alone, would run around $5 billion. Yet, says Barnett, the government has actually cut four security measures that, according to his cost-benefit analysis, amount to less than the price-tag of a successful terrorist attack: checking photo id’s at airport boarding gates; posing baggage questions to airline passengers; positive bag matches with checked luggage; and a continued ban of U.S. mail on passenger aircraft. While no traveler appreciates delays boarding a plane, and while the minutes of such delays add up to hundreds of millions of dollars per year, citizens would no doubt prefer that all reasonable efforts be made to avoid another tragedy. Relying on airport “sniffer” dogs, computer profiling and better screening devices will not be enough to forestall a terrorist strike, Barnett predicts.]]> Wed, 10 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/182 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/182 Chomsky launches a savage, two-pronged assault on national economic policies and efforts at “global domination….By now the stakes are so high that issues of survival arise,” says Chomsky.

The basic principle underlying our current economy is “to make rich people happy and make everybody else frightened.” Chomsky lays particular blame for this doctrine on Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan-- “Saint Alan”-- who claims the economy is working well because of private entrepreneurial initiative and expanding consumer choice. Chomsky disagrees. He claims that in the last 30 years, it has been public spending on such technologies as computers, satellites, the Internet and lasers that has fed the economy. And the wealth derived from these technologies has gone primarily into the hands of corporate masters, who represent a fraction of the American people. The government has used a succession of bogeymen—the Soviets, Communist insurgents around the world, and now global terrorism—to scare taxpayers into supporting core defense programs whose technologies ultimately spin off into private hands. The current administration advocates not merely controlling space, but owning it, with a new missile-based system and satellite-guided unmanned drones. This expensive strategy, combined with the doctrine of striking first at perceived enemies, may well bring global calamity.]]> Mon, 09 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/176 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/176 The gloves come off in this biting review of Bush Administration policy in “post-war Iraq.” Juan Cole believes the administration acted on a fundamental misunderstanding, imagining that by toppling the Hussein regime, all Iraqis “would be happy.” After the U.S. destroyed Hussein’s security apparatus, preexisting constituencies -- no friends to America -- came to the fore. Now, in villages throughout Iraq, Shiites devoted to a clerical Islamic state violently demand the immediate departure of U.S. troops. Ultimately, Cole says, “the U.S. is going to have to find ways of dealing with the forces it’s unleashed.”

Ivo Daalder pries open what he describes as a deeply divided administration, led by a president whose primary concern is reelection. On the one hand we find the “democratic imperialists,” who believe the only way America can be made secure is if the rest of the world is remade in our image. On the other hand, the “assertive nationalists,” who believe that “once you get rid of bad people you will have achieved the goal of making America secure.” While these two sides agreed to eliminate Saddam Hussein, they cannot agree on what comes next-- with disturbing consequences for Iraq and the U.S.

NOTE: This event was taped nine days before the capture of Saddam Hussein.]]> Tue, 20 Jan 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/173 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/173 Panelists gathered for this discussion agree that when setting weapons policy it is counterproductive to lump weapons together. The dangers from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons need to understood individually. Owen Cote says nuclear weapons, with their large-scale production process and instant lethal capacity, belong in one category, and biological and chemical weapons – easy to fabricate but difficult to manipulate – belong in another. Cote recommends securing Cold War nuclear stockpiles, and isn’t sanguine about “running down” biological or chemical agents. Jeanne Guillemin describes the historic taboo against the use of biological weapons. Although military strategists realized early on they could not “target clouds of microbes,” the Cold War enabled significant programs for agents like anthrax and tularemia. While there is a threat from such weapons, Guillemin believes their “fright value” is behind billions in homeland security programs that constitute “a tremendous distraction from more central issues.”

Steven Miller details a sea change in national policy under the Bush Administration, away from arms control and toward unilateral offense and defense, based on the argument that “we face a gaggle of rogue states and terrorists” who cannot be threatened in a retaliatory way. Miller says we’re already getting mixed results pursuing this policy – Saddam’s gone, but North Korea represents a dangerous situation. Philip Morrison calls for a return to deterrence.]]> Mon, 22 Dec 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/169 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/169 Merrie Najimy’s father told her that “making the right decision isn’t always popular but making the popular decision isn’t always right.” Each of the speakers on this panel has taken an unpopular stand following September 11th. Najimy believes that the Patriot Act codified anti-immigrant passions fired up by the terrorist attacks. She claims that more than 5,000 Arab and Muslim men are now in detention and 13 thousand have been deported – largely because of racial and religious profiling allowed by the new laws. Margie Yamamoto, who has known Congressman Honda since the 1960's briefly discusses details of the Honda family's internment and its aftermath.

Mike Honda, who was interned in 1942 at a Colorado camp with his family, says he had “flashbacks” to Pearl Harbor on 9/11. He anticipated that the same kind of civil rights violations suffered by the Japanese in the U.S. during World War 2 would be inflicted on Arabs and Muslims today. Honda says the Bush Administration and Republican leaders forged a Patriot Act that overreaches in terms of police powers. Barney Frank worries that the lack of judicial oversight in the bill has led to an erosion of basic rights, as witnessed by the indefinite detention of suspects not charged with any crime, the use of “sneak and peek” warrants and increased use of electronic surveillance.]]> Wed, 29 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video http://mitworld.mit.edu/video ]]> Tue, 28 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/156 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/156 In August 2001, MIT launched a review of the university’s commitment to unclassified research on campus. One month later, the events of September 11th gave this review a harsh immediacy, and transformed the discussion. New government policies that constrain the open exchange of information among scientists, Jerome Friedman says, will harm our national security by damaging the very way science is practiced. In particular, Friedman objects to regulations that would prevent MIT from attracting the best international scholars.

Phillip Sharp spoke to the issue of security concerns in the biological arena. It is unlikely that terrorists could come up with a monstrously effective bioweapon, he claims, because scientists aren’t skilled enough at manipulating infectious viruses and microbes. In fact, the real danger arises from such natural pathogens as smallpox, HIV or SARS. Sharp believes any future biological attack would probably involve the release of a known pathogen. He argues that strong public health institutions serve as our best defense – the same institutions that now face mounting security limits on researching lethal organisms. By preventing research and censoring publications, we may be handicapping ourselves in the fight against terror.

]]> Thu, 10 Jul 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/135 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/135 Ambassador Shattuck provides insights from his experiences as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Clinton Administration. Highlights include his analysis of the global events in the post-Cold War period which he states foreshadowed the attacks of September 11th . He defines two competing forces, the forces of integration, (centered mostly in Eastern Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, and the end of apartheid in South Africa) and the forces of disintegration, (fueled by those left behind in failed states living under severe repression) as the formula for the rise in global terror. He calls the Bush administration’s reaction to September 11th a “security response” and criticizes the Bush administration for not addressing the human rights concerns that are in need of attention.]]> Thu, 16 Jan 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/49 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/49 Building Resilient Infrastructure to Combat Terrorism: Lessons from September 11th]]> Fri, 25 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/105 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/105 Cause for War? Assessing the Bush Administration's Case Against Iraq - Part 1]]> Thu, 26 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/106 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/106 Cause for War? Assessing the Bush Administration's Case Against Iraq - Part 2]]> Thu, 19 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/93 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/93 ]]> Mon, 09 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31 Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Middle East]]> Tue, 18 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/110 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/110 New technologies allow individuals, corporations and government entities to monitor, track and identify employees, customers and the general public. This panel provides a forum to discuss security and privacy in today's global economy.]]> Mon, 03 Dec 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/43 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/43 The increasing reliance of industry and government on online information services makes malicious attacks on these systems more and more attractive and the consequences of such attacks are very serious. This talk will describe a new replication technique that allows services to withstand such Byzantine failures; the system is not only resilient to malicious attacks, but it also can continue to operate correctly in the presence of software bugs.

The new algorithm is of interest for a number of reasons. It is the first approach that allows correct functioning over the lifetime of the system provided the number of Byzantine faults occurring in some small time window (e.g., 5 minutes) is bounded. It supports general applications and works in an asynchronous environment such as the Internet. It also includes a number of important optimizations that allow it to perform well in practice. ]]> Thu, 18 Oct 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/98 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/98 ]]>