http://mitworld.mit.edu/ MIT World media in category 'Defense/Military'. en-us Tue, 24 Nov 2009 20:40:29 GMT Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/698 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/698 One of the nation’s revered technology leaders dispenses anecdotes and wisdom on the slippery subject of engineering systems (or systems engineering). Norm Augustine just can’t get a handle on the discipline: “No one agrees on what it is, or what it does.” After years in industries like Lockheed Martin, Augustine has come up with “Norm’s Rules,” and can at least define ‘system’ as “having two or more elements that interact,” and ‘engineering’ as “creating the means for performing useful functions.” But these definitions don’t get you too far in the real world.

Augustine shows a fuel control system, which some engineers might view as part of a propulsion system. In turn, aeronautical engineers might think of the entire airplane as a system, and transport engineers view aircraft as merely components in systems incorporating airports, highways, shipping lanes. Augustine continues up the ladder until “our system that started as a fuel controller…seems to have the whole universe as a system.” Like Russian Matryoshka dolls, systems can always be embedded within larger systems. Even if you try to simplify a system in terms of just a few objects with a binary, on-off interaction, things can get complex very quickly. Five elements in a system can exist in more than a million possible states. Says Augustine, “A typical earth satellite has nearly one million parts; a 747 over 5 million. How does that make you feel about flying?”

Distinguishing the significant interactions and the important external influences on a system are central to designing and problem solving. And these days, engineers must include politics, public policy and economics as part of their systems. “The trick is to bound the scope of the system so it’s not too large to be analyzed and not too small to be representative.” Doing this right is “why systems engineers should be paid so much.”

Augustine concludes with his “Dirty Dozen” systems engineering traps, which have led to embarrassing bust-ups, monumental failures, and real tragedies. Notable among these: “the ubiquitous interface,” (or absence thereof). He describes how two flight control groups used different metric units and accidentally sent a Mars-bound spacecraft whizzing off into deep space. There’s the “single-point failure,” exemplified by the collapse of a football field-sized satellite dish due to a poorly designed bracket. There’s software, “which like entropy, always increases:” a Mariner spacecraft headed in the wrong direction due to a missing hyphen in 100 thousand lines of code. The problem with most systems ultimately is that they “contain human elements … and humans sometimes do irrational things.” ]]> Fri, 20 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/647 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/647 These five security specialists seem dubious about major Defense Department reforms as the Obama administration winds into action.

Cindy Williams first unloads these basics: the U.S. FY 2009 Department of Defense non-war budget is over half a trillion dollars – “about as much money as the rest of the world combined spends on their military endeavors;” another $200 billion is going to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military is the nation’s and possibly the world’s largest employer, with 1.4 million active duty men and women and another million plus in the guard, reserves and civilian side. But in spite of this manpower and budget, says Williams, “the Secretary of Defense will face daunting constraints,” from the current economic meltdown, to the looming entitlement deficit posed by baby boomer retirement. Williams also notes a set of pressures driving costs skyward, not least of which include the likelihood of global conflicts springing up.

There’s a “popular parlor game in D.C.,” says Owen Coté, of tracking “elaborate, often baroque programs that are over budget, to figure out which will be canceled.” To Coté’s thinking, “dozens of programs fit into that category.” Complicating this “game” is a tug of war among the different services. The perception, says Coté, is of “a zero-sum fight for resources between the Army and Marine Corps, and the Navy and Air Force on the other hand.” Yet all our forces must prepare for both irregular warfare (military operations that don’t involve states), and traditional wars against nations with militaries. The simplest approach to Defense program allocations, Coté says, “is to decide what kinds of wars we think we’re going to fight, and what is the relevance of the program in one of these kinds of wars. If it doesn’t look relevant to either, I’ve got some candidates to help you save money.”

“I don’t think much new will happen in the new administration,” says Harvey Sapolsky. “It helps that Republicans started a big, messy war.” But Sapolsky is worried about “continuities,” including the U.S. “propensity to intervene internationally,” “exploitation of our gullibility about management systems,” and “wishful thinking about inter-organizational agency coordination.” We’re fortunately “out of troops” to do interventions he says, but he imagines we’ll still find ourselves “in the thick of it unnecessarily.” He wishes there could be a “moratorium on management fads in DOD,” the endless discussion of achieving reforms when “defense is inherently an inefficient enterprise.”

William Fallon sees a mountain of DOD “desirements,” stemming from an endless “to-do list of things people want done in the name of security.” Well-intended outsiders, from Congress to the general public, press for new weapons programs, and military interventions. We “have a phenomenal budget, filled with all kinds of things, that if you lay them out, you’re probably hard-pressed to find a connection between that line item and national security.” Nevertheless, “despite all the hand wringing, inefficiencies and angst, overall, security for the country stands in pretty darn good shape.” ]]> Thu, 12 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/645 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/645 While he admits to no surprise about events in Gaza, Noam Chomsky does consider “the latest U.S.-Israeli attack on helpless Palestinians” a step beyond terrorism and aggression. He says “some new term is needed for the sadistic and cowardly torture of people caged with no possibility of escape, being pounded daily by the most sophisticated products of U.S. military technology.”

Chomsky says these “new crimes” don’t fit easily into any standard category except for “familiarity,” and his talk recaps the history of Israeli relations with Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere. He notes that while many are engaged in “sober debate on what the attackers hope to achieve,” he doesn’t find Israeli motives at all “obscure.” Chomsky says “rational Israeli hard-liners” decided it was senseless to subsidize the illegal Israeli settlement of Gaza in 2005, which would have required significant resources. Instead, they decided to back settlement of the West Bank, a more valuable territory, with its arable land and water supplies. The intent of this criminal annexation is “a vastly expanded Jerusalem.” Says Chomsky, “It made more sense to turn Gaza into the world’s largest prison, and let people rot.”

Upcoming elections influenced the timing of the Gaza invasion, he continues. Ehud Barak was lagging badly in the polls, and an attack in the name of defending Israel against Hamas rockets was calculated to buy Barak parliamentary seats, says Chomsky. And while every state has a right to defend itself against criminal attacks, there’s “a matter of choice of action in the first place, proportional or not. Any resort to force always carries a heavy burden of proof.” Israel surely has a “peaceful alternative to the use of force on its territory,” says Chomsky: It could accept a ceasefire.

Chomsky recites a litany of examples of Israeli and U.S. hypocrisy in action and policy around Israel’s claimed desire for peace. “Of course it wants peace, everyone wants peace. Hitler wanted peace, for example. The question is, on what terms.” Going back to the earliest days of the Zionist movement, it was clear that Israel wanted to delay a political settlement, “while building facts on the ground.” Says Chomsky, “Today Israel could have security, and normalization of relations and integration into the region, but it clearly prefers illegal expansion, conflict, repeated exercise of violence, to teach lessons to the ‘two-legged beasts,’ actions that are severely eroding its security even if it gains short-term military victory.” He concludes, “We’re observing a rare moment in history: politicide, the murder of a nation at our hands.” ]]> Mon, 05 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/630 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/630 “I’ve drunk kava in the South Pacific and rubbed noses with natives,” says William Fallon. “I’ve enjoyed tender baby camel as a delicacy. I’ve met presidents, kings, prime ministers and many ordinary folks. I’ve done a lot of things. That was yesterday. What matters is today and tomorrow.” Now, says Fallon, is the time for all Americans to get down to business addressing the key crises confronting them. And he does mean ordinary Americans, not just the next president.

As a naval man with 45 years of experience dealing with conflicts all over the world, Fallon figures that the major challenges facing the nation will be at minimum “daunting,” but they are not beyond our collective capability. There’s the financial crisis; nuclear and other threats from Iran, North Korea and wide-ranging terror organizations; the competition for resources and the issue of climate change; and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. All these issues are global, and increasingly interconnected, notes Fallon, and addressing them will require “close cooperation with other nations.”

The problem is that the U.S. has lost much credibility internationally in recent years, says Fallon, and so our leaders will have to reestablish the trust and confidence the rest of the world once had in our country. While top politicians can begin a process of diplomacy and cooperative engagements with other nations, Fallon thinks it’s equally or more important for ordinary Americans “to get our domestic house in order.” He’s of the opinion that the individual behaviors of Americans “have contributed to a general malaise,” and only by addressing these on an individual basis will our nation be able “to reestablish its prestige and influence for the betterment of a very interdependent world.”

Fallon focuses on the U.S. education system, which apart from world class universities like MIT, “wallows in underperformance … releasing millions of alleged graduates who can neither read nor write, understand math beyond elementary levels, find any place on a map….” Add to this “mediocrity” the fact that Americans feed their “self-indulgence in personal material goods” while starving such critical infrastructure as bridges and roads, which enable daily activities. Our critics rightly view us as “increasingly self-centered and heedless of the interests of others,” notes Fallon. It’s time to set our priorities straight. The U.S. has the “human capital, traditional values and the immense resources to take on and fix any of these problems.” What remains is the “willingness to do the job. Let’s get going,” he concludes. ]]> Tue, 14 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/605 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/605 After tuning in closely to the presidential campaign, these panelists don’t discern worlds of difference in the candidates’ approaches to foreign policy. But the speakers convey key concerns and offer words of advice to the next U.S. president.

Barry Posen is interested in the future of U.S. grand strategy, by which he means our plan for achieving and maintaining security and power. Thus far, says Posen, both presidential candidates “largely share the same view on U.S. grand strategy,” which is very expansive, with “a long, global agenda for U.S. security goals.”

Both sides agree on the continued struggle against terror, containment of rogue states, and a commitment to the spread of democracy. Their disagreements are “tactical, though not trivial,” involving for instance the relevance of international institutions, and the role of diplomacy. Posen worries that both campaigns “overlook key problems in U.S. post-Cold War strategy or offer facile answers.” Money is a big problem: we’ve been financing military ventures with so much borrowed money that Posen wonders if our power position in the world hasn’t been diminished. The candidates “tend to talk about national security policy as if there are no resource constraints,” and if the next president adopts the same unfettered approach, the U.S. risks provoking other nations -- pushing them to act recklessly and build up their militaries. Candidates must join the issue of “whether or not we need to make tradeoffs between solving problems at home and slaying dragons abroad.”

Carol Saivetz worries that the next president will usher in a new cold war with Russia. The past eight years have led to a steady erosion of U.S.-Russian relations. When Putin came to power, he “wanted to play in the old boy’s club,” but met with a series of “perceived and real humiliations,” from NATO expansion to Kosovo. Because “Russia is a superpower wanna be,” says Saivetz, the next president must “craft serious policy towards Russian and not just knee-jerk reactions.”

Toward that end, Saivetz recommends the new administration develop a consistent and even tone of discourse with the Russians; keep them in international institutions but “reign them in tightly;” work with Russia on all issues where there’s a commonality of interests, such as terrorism; make room for Russia in the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program; and if U.S. missile defense must go on in Europe, at least give the Russians access to sites. “We must stop this tit for tat retail,” she says, noting Russia’s new interest in Venezuela. The next president must “pull back from the edge; it sounds like Cuba.”

The candidates are not really discussing Asia, says Taylor Fravel, but they are surprisingly similar in what they do say. He describes a set of challenges to the next administration, including handling the evolving crisis with North Korea’s nuclear program; maintaining stability in Taiwan and Chinese relations; achieving a climate change agreement with China; engaging multilateral institutions like ASEAN rather than bilateral military agreements; and “coping with and accommodating China’s rise.” ]]> Sun, 06 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/572 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/572 The Bush administration began its “great misuse of history” shortly after 9/11, says
John Dower, when it seized upon Japan’s 1941 Pearl Harbor attack as a useful analogy, a way to promote its own invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation. Dower views as simplistic these “popular hooks to history” and mercilessly slashes away at the Bush administration’s continuing efforts to manipulate the public with historical imagery and example. Yet, with his more refined historical lens, Dower finds some unsettling areas of congruence between those days and our own times.

Reflecting on popular associations between 9/11 and Iraq, and Pearl Harbor and Japan, Dower offers two lines of analysis (and suggests he’s got a few more up his sleeve): what he calls “a Pearl Harbor code,” and “Ground Zero 2001 and Ground Zero 1945.” The first area involves comparing explanations of failures of intelligence that might have anticipated the attacks. Congressional and other investigations of the 1941 and 2001 attacks reveal that despite lots of “noise and chatter,” intelligence agencies grossly miscalculated and missed enemy intentions. This represents “not just system breakdown, but a stunning failure of the imagination,” says Dower. In both cases, the U.S. was caught unawares because it misjudged the enemy in a manner typical of “white supremacists,” simultaneously diminishing the other side’s capabilities and casting it as irrational or illogical. In an ironic aside, Dower notes that the Japanese launched their war on “a wish and a prayer, with no contingency planning and no serious contemplation of worst case scenarios.” How like the “U.S. strategic imbecility in the Iraqi invasion,” he says.

Dower’s second analytical line describes how a “clash of civilizations” argument has emerged powerfully since 9/11. Americans believe that Ground Zero 2001 marked the start of a new era -- the West opposing an Islamic culture that devalues human life. But Dower shows that a war machine targeting civilians and noncombatants went into high gear during World War II, with the U.S. and British air wars against Germany, then Japan. Airborne slaughter of innocents became standard operating procedure, part of an “ideological group think we associate with cultures of war.” Victims are no longer individual civilians, but entire nations. Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor became “codes for mass destruction and psychological warfare,” adopted by both bin Laden and the U.S. -- “one side using this as a model for the horrors of 9/11, the other finding inspiration in what we call the cutting edge of shock and awe, tactics that were presumably to ensure victory in the invasion of Iraq.” ]]> Thu, 27 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/510 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/510 It’s time to trade in the Department of Homeland Security for a Department of Homeland Vulnerabilities, says Charles Perrow. At its peril, our nation “privileges terrorism over natural and industrial disasters.”

From Perrow’s perspective, the U.S. landscape is riddled with “weapons of mass destruction:” chemical plants; vital infrastructure such as bridges and levees; aging nuclear power plants; large, centralized providers of energy, water and food, all of which are obvious targets for natural disasters, accidents or attack. “There are 123 locations in our nation where a vapor cloud released by an accident or terror attack could endanger over 1 million people,” says Perrow. Freight trains loaded with poisons lumber through our cities every day. With global warming, storms, floods and fires are on the increase. And the internet is “held hostage to Microsoft’s command of 90% of the operating systems that we use.” This means hackers with malicious intent could subvert sensitive facilities like our power grid and infiltrate the U.S. military.

We can’t prevent and mitigate our way out of this fix, no matter what administration is in office, says Perrow, although he bemoans the enormous erosion of regulatory oversight during the Bush era. He proposes instead such steps as removing hazardous materials from major population centers; dispersing vulnerable populations; breaking up or decentralizing large organizations; and codifying these measures through stringent laws. This approach won’t likely win him friends in places like New Orleans, a city he hopes will not spring back to its pre-Katrina size. Cities in risky areas should be downsized, and provided with multiple evacuation routes and redundant means of protection and emergency services. “If we rely only on a few, we will be in peril.”

He takes aim at defenders of big organizations, who say we need economies of scale to function in a global economy. “Bigger is not safer,” says Perrow. The larger the manufacturing plant, or internet service network, the more concentrated the power, the more likely an accident of consequence is to take place. We need many smaller, interconnected facilities, which can provide adequate economic efficiency. Perrow cites some “baby steps” in the right direction -- laws mandating public disclosure and inventories of hazardous materials and processes, and the switch by manufacturers to less poisonous substances. But real results “all depend on politics.” ]]> Thu, 05 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/459 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/459 Perhaps no one comprehends the roots of depravity and cruelty better than Philip Zimbardo. He is renowned for such research as the Stanford Prison Experiment, which demonstrated how, in the right circumstances, ordinary people can swiftly become amoral monsters. Evil is not so much inherent in individuals, Zimbardo showed, but emerges dependably when a sequence of dehumanizing and stressful circumstances unfolds. It is no wonder then, that Zimbardo has lent both his expertise and moral outrage to the case of U.S. reservists who perpetrated the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.

Zimbardo’s latest book, The Lucifer Effect, attempts to understand “how good people do evil deeds.” His talk outlines his involvement as expert witness for the defense team of one of the military police officers responsible at Abu Ghraib, and also provides a rich history of psychological research into the kind of behavior transformations evident in Iraq. First, Zimbardo presents a slideshow of Abu Ghraib abominations, including some digital photos that were not widely distributed by the media. Then he digs deep into the archives for a horrifically illustrated tour of experiments that make a persuasive case that certain, predictable situations corrupt people into wielding power in a destructive way.

He describes Stanley Milgram’s 1963 Yale-based research demonstrating that people will behave sadistically when confronted by “an authority in a lab coat.” A vast majority of the subjects delivered what they were told were dangerous electric shocks to a learner in another room, to the point of apparently killing the other person. Researchers skeptical of his results replicated them. This time, professors demanded that students shock real puppies standing on electrified grills. Zimbardo’s own prison experiment turned an ordinary group of young men into power-hungry “guards,” humiliating equally ordinary “prisoners” in the basement of Stanford’s psychology building. The descent into barbarity was so rapid that Zimbardo had to cancel the experiment after a few days.

The recipe for behavior change isn’t complicated. “All evil begins with a big lie,” says Zimbardo, whether it’s a claim to be following the word of God, or the need to stamp out political opposition. A seemingly insignificant step follows, with successive small actions, presented as essential by an apparently just authority figure. The situation presents others complying with the same rules, perhaps protesting, but following along all the same. If the victims are anonymous or dehumanized somehow, all the better. And exiting the situation is extremely difficult.

Abu Ghraib fit this type of situation to a T, says Zimbardo. The guards, never trained for their work helping military interrogators, worked 12-hour shifts, 40 days without a break, in chaotic, filthy conditions, facing 1,000 foreign prisoners, and hostile fire from the neighborhood. They operated in extreme stress, under orders to impose fear on their prisoners. Zimbardo believes the outcome was perfectly predictable, and while never absolving these soldiers of personal responsibility, believes justice won’t be done until “the people who created the situation go on trial as well: George Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and George Bush.” ]]> Thu, 07 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/453 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/453 It’s no wonder there was an outcry when Gilbert Burnham’s group released its report on mortality in Iraq. The numbers of civilian deaths so overwhelmed body counts calculated by other groups that many were stunned or disbelieving, and Burnham earned the enmity of some U.S. and Iraqi government officials.

Burnham’s public health team looked at pre- and post-invasion deaths. The 2004 study showed that the mortality rate among Iraqis before the invasion was 2%, and after, 7.9%. The 2006 survey, which polled more households and covered greater territory, was more devastating: In the three years since the invasion, crude mortality rose to 13.2 per 1000 people per year. The leading cause was gunshot wounds and deaths from car bombs. The majority of victims of violence were men, 15-45 years old, and children also died in great numbers. By the end of the analysis period, crude mortality rates approached 17 deaths per 1000 per year.

The most disturbing statistic is the report’s estimate that there have been 654,000 excess deaths since the invasion of March 2003 -- 600,000 from violent causes. Critics, who are legion, Burnham acknowledges, point fingers at his study’s methodology, accusing his group of inaccurate and inadequate record-keeping, or skewing the numbers for political purposes.

Burnham notes that getting actual body counts in Iraq is literally impossible, since there is no working system for keeping accurate track of the dead in hospitals and mortuaries, and “numbers are highly susceptible to manipulation.” The backbone of public health studies are surveys, in which geographic clusters are chosen, households counted and individuals interviewed. As the number of clusters increase, “precision improves and confidence intervals narrow.” This enables measurements “accurate and precise enough to make the right decisions even though we will never have absolute, true numbers to two or three decimal points.”

At great personal peril, Burnham’s on-ground Iraqi surveyors went house to house in neighborhoods all over Iraq, asking for death certificates. The author of the report “hid out at a basement of a hotel, and finally got out on forged U.N. documents.” The 2004 survey reached 7868 people, and the 2006 contacted 12,800 individuals. The sample size was large enough to support the team’s grisly conclusions. Civilians are doing badly in this war, dying in far greater numbers than combatants. Burnham’s hope is to use such data “to protect people wrapped up in conflict,” since this “won’t be the only one in the 21st century.” ]]> Wed, 09 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/445 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/445 Joseph Cirincione delivers an energetic and at times impassioned primer on the standoff with Iran on its nuclear program, drawn in part from his latest book, The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, Spring 2007).

He offers a succinct ‘equation’ to describe what drives nations to acquire nuclear weapons: 3P+T+E, where power (security), prestige, politics (domestic), technology and economics combine in various ways to tip a nation toward joining the nuclear club. If one or more of these factors can be blunted somehow – for instance, through economic or political incentives, or preventing the free flow of fissile material and technology – then nuclear-inclined nations may be persuaded to change course.

The current tense situation with Iran throws such drivers into vivid relief. Cirincione first notes that Iran’s nuclear weapons development began under the U.S.-installed Shah, who was to be our “gendarme in the Gulf.” His program had the backing of many of today’s key U.S. political figures, including Vice President Cheney. After the 1979 revolution, Iranian leaders continued the program, acquiring technology from Pakistan, to counter Iraq, which had its own weapons program, and which invaded Iran in the early 80s. One million Iranians died in this war, and no one came to their aid, says Cirincione. “Iranians remember they were alone. You have to understand history to understand why Iran may want nuclear weapons now.”

But in a twist, Cirincione hypothesizes that Iran did not get far with its nuclear development and that it doesn’t currently have a secret weapons program. While Iran maintains it has the right to acquire nuclear technology, it won’t admit to its past weapons work. That would “blow their whole story line, that it’s against Islam to have nuclear weapons.” So they stall international inspections and hope “by obfuscation and delay they can drag out the issue, and the world will acquiesce to their plans.”

With Iran insisting on moving ahead with uranium enrichment, what are the options? Cirincione takes aim at the current U.S. default policy, “to muddle through.” He also scoffs at the idea of regime change in Iran, since Iraq teaches that “democratic transformation takes a long time.” He saves his most poisonous barbs for U.S. neoconservatives, who are hatching military plans to sweep through Iran. “This is nuts,” says Cirincione, a strategy driven by people with “messianic impulses” who perceive “one great Islamo-fascist threat.” Iran could respond to attack by shutting down oil traffic, or attacking U.S. servicemen in Iraq; rage in the Islamic world “would put at risk American economic, political and cultural institutions worldwide.” Plus, Iranians “would go pedal to the metal to get a bomb as quickly as they could.”

The alternative, says Cirincione, is to contain and engage: expand harsh sanctions against Iran and create fractures among Iranian political factions. We “back them into a corner, then give them a way out,” says Cirincione. “Negotiations aren’t appeasement, they’re statecraft. We should be having direct discussions with Iran.” ]]> Mon, 27 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/404 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/404 As viewed through the eyes of two well-informed journalists and an experienced Middle East diplomat, the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated a unique combination of arrogance and ignorance, and the “reconstruction” period appears a fiasco with no end in sight. Here’s a sampling of panelists’ disturbing insights and anecdotes:

Barbara Bodine recalls meeting with senior administration officials during pre-war days: “Iraq was to be a blank slate, to prove the tenets of the Bush administration’s governing philosophy… One senior advisor admits he read no books on Iraq; he wanted an open mind.”

George Packer reports that in spite of evidence that the “ideological project” that led to the Iraq war was deeply flawed, officials remained committed to it. “Iraq was a … more shattered society than most people understood. …There was no order to hold Iraq together of any kind, once Saddam was gone. America was not in control from day one,” says Packer. Jay Garner, the first post-war occupation administrator, was recalled to Washington after failing to restore order. But his debriefing session with the president was a “backslapping session,” according to Packer. “The president said to Garner, ‘Do you want to do Iran for the next one?’ Garner said, ‘No, sir, me and the boys are holding out for Cuba.’”

Rajiv Chandrasakaran, describing the administration’s almost hare-brained take on post-war planning, tells how U.S. reconstruction officials were intent on creating a western-style capitalist democratic Iraq. In a country with no functioning security, chaos on the streets, and bombed-out hospitals, occupation officials (in large part political appointees) focused on such details as imposing a flat tax and intellectual property law, establishing a traffic code modeled on the state of Maryland’s, and privatizing the system of delivering drugs. Says Chandrasakaran, “Had we not gone in there as an occupying force and not squandered political capital earned by toppling a despised dictator, and had we mobilized enough reconstruction resources and implemented them in a meaningful way…we would have made far greater progress.”

Packer says “the president is enshrouded with yes men and yes women who know the political angle and will not allow anything that cuts against it to get inside the Oval Office. …There’s an institutional malaise that’s frightening.” But, notes Packer, “I don’t think the president is saying in private, as we now know LBJ was saying in the 60s, what a god-awful mess this is, how am I ever going to get out of it. I think the president believes history will vindicate him, if he just holds firm and keeps his resolve -- that in 50 years people will say he was a visionary leader. If that’s going to continue to be the case, no change in policy small or large will save us.” ]]> Wed, 15 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/403 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/403 True to form, Noam Chomsky makes a sweeping and copiously detailed indictment of U.S. Middle East policy, brooking no contrary or alternate views. His history-filled lecture (interrupted by occasional applause) focuses on four crises, involving the Palestinians, the Lebanon invasion, the Iraq war and the “impending catastrophe in Iran.”

While to many the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel seems hopeless, “degenerating to tribal warfare, an endless cycle of revenge and fanaticism,” says Chomsky, a “very clear solution” has long existed: For years, UN resolutions have proposed recognizing the rights of all states in the region to live in peace and security, and called for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Chomsky says that while Arab states have supported these ideas, the U.S. and Israel have deliberately undermined and opposed them. The “threat of peace has arisen constantly,” says Chomsky, but U.S.-Israeli “rejectionism” has blocked all efforts and led to “continued theft of lands” and a “weakening of the Palestinian collective.”

Chomsky calls the Israeli rationale for attacking Lebanon “pure cynical farce.” The claim that Hizbollah’s capture of an Israeli soldier necessitated a savage assault flies in the face of Israel’s decades-long practice of kidnapping Lebanese civilians, says Chomsky. Israel, with U.S. collusion, he continues, did as much damage against the Lebanese infrastructure as possible before a ceasefire was accepted. Israeli rockets destroyed a fuel storage tank, creating a giant oil spill that has poisoned the coast line up to Syria.

With respect to Iraq, Chomsky believes the invading armies are obligated “to pay massive reparations for crimes of aggression,” and that the people responsible for the extreme crimes” should be put on trial. The prospect of “a sovereign Iraq would be a complete nightmare,” given the nation’s increasing solidarity with Shiite allies in oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since “controlling the world’s energy resources has been a prime objective” of U.S. foreign policy for much of the last century, serious withdrawal plans seem pretty remote to Chomsky.

Finally, Chomsky scoffs at the Bush Administration’s “willingness” to negotiate with Iran about its nuclear ambitions, since a U.S. precondition for talks requires no uranium enrichment, and the U.S. “refuses to withdraw threats of attack.” Chomsky claims that U.S. threats are real, with recent deployment of U.S. air power in the area. The impact of such threats harms Iranian democracy reformers, “who are complaining bitterly,” and further blackens the U.S. reputation in the world, where we are perceived as a peace-threatening “lawless and dangerous rogue state.”

Chomsky concludes by reminding everyone that this “awful news is actually good news,” since the “means and power to end these crimes and further ones lies in our hands.”

]]> Fri, 10 Feb 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/326 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/326 Gary Hart wields his national security expertise to query these two authors in detail on their latest collaboration. Benjamin summarizes the book this way: “By pursuing the policies we have, we are hastening the next attack. I’m not talking about a run of the mill attack, the kind society could learn to live with, but a really big attack, which will endanger our institutions, confidence and society.” The authors believe the U.S. intervention in Iraq has spawned a new Iraqi insurgency and energized the greater Islamic jihad. Hart asks if it’s solely U.S. policy that’s creating an increasingly virulent movement, or whether homegrown “Islamic brutality” and belief must share some blame. Simon responds that our actions in the Middle East and elsewhere make it very difficult for Islamic moderates to counter “the observed experience of Muslims in many parts of the world.” A lot of energy that went into Arab nationalism, says Benjamin, now enters a violent movement “to embrace justice, freedom and fairness.” He continues, “The sense of imposition by the West will remain there, and grievances won’t go away even if we pull up stakes tomorrow.”

The authors warn that Islamic fighters in Iraq are getting valuable experience in military operations in urban terrain, which they will likely apply to Western cities. They call for a new policy in the Middle East and South Asia, involving functioning alliances to counter terrorism, as well as creating incentives for hostile leaders to change their behaviors. Benjamin says, “Don’t conduct foreign policy adventures,” because these inevitably give “the bin Laden argument a powerful leg up. We’ve got to stop doing that…. We need people to go back to believing in America as the upholder of ideals it was not too long ago.” ]]> Fri, 16 Sep 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/287 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/287 In this bitter commemoration of the end of the Vietnam War, the speakers dispel any comforting notion that Americans have absorbed lessons from that bloody time, much less sought the truth. Ngo Ving Long describes how the United States policy of pacification, starting in the early ‘50s, involved “incredible assassinations of people at the local level.” The U.S. blocked free elections, and helped the Saigon regime annihilate not just Communists, but eventually hundreds of thousands of peasants in the south who took up arms to defend themselves. Long has intimate knowledge. As a teenager, he met some U.S. generals at a club in Saigon. Seeking to travel around his country, Long agreed to make maps of villages for the U.S. military’s anti-malarial disease program, which he quickly learned was a cover for rooting out suspected subversives. “When I protested to higher ups, ‘You’re making people suffer and producing more enemies, more Communists’, I was told, ‘This is how we defeated them in Malaysia and the Philippines.’ It turned out not to be the case.”

Noam Chomsky expands on this grim chronicle, characterizing the slaughter of the civilian population of the south “as one of the worst, if not the worst, war crime of the post-Second World War era.” He says the United States’ “basic war aim was to destroy the country,” out of concern that an independent Vietnam “would undertake a course of development that others might want to follow—it was a virus that might infect others.” Chomsky scoffs at the view, circulated at least among Iraq-focused media, that the public has a Vietnam fixation. “There’s no concern, let alone obsession, about what actually happened in Vietnam,” says Chomsky. “Unless people like us become capable of looking in the mirror honestly, then biology’s only experiment with higher intelligence is likely to prove quite brief.” ]]> Tue, 28 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/272 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/272 U.S. actions in Iraq get a thorough thrashing in this final chapter of the Reconstructing Iraq series. First, Yosef Jabareen sprints through editorial page cartoons from Arab print media, which represent the U.S. as immoral, abusive, greedy and above all, hegemonic. The drawings depict George Bush burning the world or swallowing up Arab nations, and a map of Iraq morphs into a division of the U.S. energy department. One cartoon shows the United Nations watching passively as the globe commits suicide. In these images, Arab leaders are corrupt puppets of U.S. policy and Iraqi insurgents are brutally oppressed heroes.

Noam Chomsky paints his own cynical picture of the conflict in Iraq. “The U.S. goal … certainly had nothing to do with stopping atrocities,” he says, and even less to do with advancing political freedom. “The U.S. promotes democracy when it’s in our strategic and economic interests and opposes democracy when it’s not.” Chomsky continues, “It’s almost inconceivable that the U.S. could permit a sovereign, democratic Iraq. The reasons are transparent.” Iraq, he predicts, would form an alliance with Iran, helping foment Shiite rebellion in Saudi Arabia, leading to “a Shiite alliance controlling most of the world’s energy.” Even more worrisome, Iraq would “rearm and develop weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent.” Chomsky notes, “The one thing the U.S. invasion taught everyone is you better have WMDs to protect yourself from U.S. attack.” Poses Chomsky, “Would the U.S. sit by and allow this? …. The chances are zero.” So contrary to our own “messianic vision” of implementing democracy, the U.S. will try to “run Iraq.” Chomsky’s alternative: pay Iraq billions in reparations for having supported Saddam Hussein, for years of painful sanctions, and hand the country over to the Iraqis as soon as possible. ]]> Sun, 27 Feb 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/250 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/250 Judging from these panelists, the more intimate your experience of Iraq, the more optimistic you are likely to be. David J. Nash was fully immersed. He organized the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort of Iraq’s infrastructure in 45 days. His 2800 projects ran the gamut from new power plants and water companies, to schools and medical clinics. If that wasn’t enough, he had to use peacetime contracting rules and contend with terrorist attacks. “Some people were afraid we’d fail, some feared we’d succeed, and they’d get together and make my job interesting,” says Nash. Yet, in spite of the obstacles, including the ongoing insurgency, Nash believes the “future is bright.”

Charles N. Patterson engaged with Iraqis in envisioning a Saddam-free future -- before the invasion. The “Future of Iraq Project” brought together diaspora Iraqis and Kurdish Iraqis with U.S. government agencies in the summer of 2002 to envision a political transition. Seventeen working groups tackled such questions as what to do with the large Baath security forces, and how to introduce democratic ideals. The problem was not only a lack of consensus but conflicted U.S. intentions. “Voices in the administration…sold the idea that Iraq liberated would immediately embrace democracy, modernize and be at peace.” Today, Patterson believes “a lot of things have begun to go right after a bad start.”

Harvey Sapolsky states the U.S. handled the war effectively but that “when the war ended, things seemed to fall apart.” Sapolsky participated in a Defense Science Board review of war planning and post-war administration. We’ve “handicapped ourselves in two ways,” says Sapolsky. “We don’t have a colonial service…so no one’s planning to stay a long time,” and “we don’t have a contracting system to run reconstruction during an insurgency.”

]]> Tue, 14 Dec 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/242 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/242 The Super Soldier has one foot out of the lab, and will be reporting for battle by 2020. “Dutch” DeGay’s Army researchers have begun to “rebuild the soldier from the skin out.” Current infantrymen, stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan, must shoot, move and communicate carrying upwards of 100 pounds of personal armor and equipment. DeGay’s team aims not only to lighten the load, but integrate this soldier into a larger ground and air network. The warrior’s new helmet will house radio and night vision gear, GPS antenna, target illuminator, tactical dropdown eyewear, and will convey data, video and audio feeds for “a 3D picture of the battlefield… in the chaos of battle.” New, ceramic-impregnated body armor can take a strike, evenly absorb the shock, then deform in space without ever touching human skin. Says DeGay, “Comfort has never been part of the paradigm, but now armor will protect and be comfortable.” Steve Altes believes that the next generation of battle gear will go even further to enhance the soldier’s survivability, through the “magic of nanotechnology.” These tiny, molecular building blocks can confer revolutionary properties on everyday materials, such as fabrics.

Ned Thomas’ MIT researchers are looking at ways of transforming the battle suit with a range of smart textiles that will: become rigid when necessary (for instance, create a splint for a broken leg); sense chemical or biological threats and protect a soldier automatically; determine the cause of an injury and administer medicine; and someday, recycle sweat to serve as potable water and as a body cooling device. Thomas says that “some products are already bearing nanofruit,” such as a conducting polymer that can detect TNT, in use now in Iraq.

]]> Thu, 19 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/179 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/179 Saddam Hussein left a very visible legacy from 30 bloody years in power: countless victims and a broken nation. But there is also a more obscure inheritance, literally mountains of documents left by the Ba’ath Party and security groups. Kanan Makiya’s mission is to retrieve and index these materials, and make public the comprehensive corruption of the old regime. These are not just precise and voluminous records of an oppressive state, says Makiya. These are stories of ordinary Iraqis. Everyday survival meant spying on or betraying family and friends. Even graduating from high school depended on proving loyalty to the state. So it is not a simple matter of determining who did what to whom. “All Iraqis participated and were complicit in the regime. That is what the archives show,” Makiya says. He believes that nation-building will be possible only after all Iraqis admit their responsibility for the country’s disrepair. He is seeking a “form of cathartic social release that will have political consequences.” But Makiya acknowledges enormous challenges to achieving this goal, as the U.S. prepares to withdraw from a lawless, fragmented Iraq -- having set in motion the large tasks of holding elections and drafting a constitution.]]> Mon, 09 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/176 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/176 The gloves come off in this biting review of Bush Administration policy in “post-war Iraq.” Juan Cole believes the administration acted on a fundamental misunderstanding, imagining that by toppling the Hussein regime, all Iraqis “would be happy.” After the U.S. destroyed Hussein’s security apparatus, preexisting constituencies -- no friends to America -- came to the fore. Now, in villages throughout Iraq, Shiites devoted to a clerical Islamic state violently demand the immediate departure of U.S. troops. Ultimately, Cole says, “the U.S. is going to have to find ways of dealing with the forces it’s unleashed.”

Ivo Daalder pries open what he describes as a deeply divided administration, led by a president whose primary concern is reelection. On the one hand we find the “democratic imperialists,” who believe the only way America can be made secure is if the rest of the world is remade in our image. On the other hand, the “assertive nationalists,” who believe that “once you get rid of bad people you will have achieved the goal of making America secure.” While these two sides agreed to eliminate Saddam Hussein, they cannot agree on what comes next-- with disturbing consequences for Iraq and the U.S.

NOTE: This event was taped nine days before the capture of Saddam Hussein.]]> Tue, 20 Jan 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/173 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/173 Panelists gathered for this discussion agree that when setting weapons policy it is counterproductive to lump weapons together. The dangers from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons need to understood individually. Owen Cote says nuclear weapons, with their large-scale production process and instant lethal capacity, belong in one category, and biological and chemical weapons – easy to fabricate but difficult to manipulate – belong in another. Cote recommends securing Cold War nuclear stockpiles, and isn’t sanguine about “running down” biological or chemical agents. Jeanne Guillemin describes the historic taboo against the use of biological weapons. Although military strategists realized early on they could not “target clouds of microbes,” the Cold War enabled significant programs for agents like anthrax and tularemia. While there is a threat from such weapons, Guillemin believes their “fright value” is behind billions in homeland security programs that constitute “a tremendous distraction from more central issues.”

Steven Miller details a sea change in national policy under the Bush Administration, away from arms control and toward unilateral offense and defense, based on the argument that “we face a gaggle of rogue states and terrorists” who cannot be threatened in a retaliatory way. Miller says we’re already getting mixed results pursuing this policy – Saddam’s gone, but North Korea represents a dangerous situation. Philip Morrison calls for a return to deterrence.]]> Wed, 30 Jul 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/140 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/140 A U.S. Army soldier carries more than 100 pounds of gear into battle. What can be done to lighten the load, while still providing maximum protection? Edwin Thomas, Director of MIT’s new Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies, describes an alternative to the past practice of “dressing up a soldier like a Christmas tree”. He describes instead, a dynamic battle suit that wards off bullets and biochemical threats while providing real-time data on the soldier’s medical condition. Thomas, who spent time training for this project at Fort Polk, explains how interdisciplinary teams are exploring nanomaterial designs that could also benefit civilian emergency responders.]]> Mon, 12 May 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/116 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/116 Former Secretary of State and MIT alum, George Shultz returned to MIT to accept the Robert A. Muh Award for his noteworthy achievements. In this talk he reflects on his time at MIT and expresses appreciation for the lessons he learned at MIT that influence him to this day.

Reflecting on the current state of the world, he discussed the complex interaction between strength and diplomacy, and says "the United States should equip itself militarily to be powerful enough so that no one in their right mind would want to challenge us".

He also declares the "use of forces for preemptive action should be reserved for cases of extreme danger". He talks about Iraq, the first Gulf War and the situation in North Korea, which he calls "a case where prevention has failed".]]> Fri, 18 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/32 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/32 Rocco Casagrande was the chief of the Biological Analysis Lab for the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) from December 2002 to March 2003. He gives a detailed account of the daily activities of inspectors, and the processes involved in determining, for example, if a brewery is really a brewery, or a front for chemical weapons production. He has completed his work with the U.N. and emphasized that in his appearance at MIT, he is speaking for himself, and does not represent the United Nations. ]]> Thu, 27 Feb 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/38 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/38 Ambassador Gallucci focuses most of this talk on North Korea, and discusses the following questions:
Do we have a crisis in North Korea?
Why do we have one, if we do have one now?
How did we get to where we are with North Korea?
Where do we go from here?

This event is chaired by Stephen W. Van Evera, MIT Political Science Professor and Associate Director of CIS.]]> Fri, 25 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/105 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/105 Cause for War? Assessing the Bush Administration's Case Against Iraq - Part 1]]> Mon, 07 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/48 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/48 After the terrorists attack of September 11, three Academies-the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine-sponsored a major study of the role that science and technology might play in countering the threat of catastrophic terrorism in the United States. This study involved a committee of 24 experts, co-chaired by Lewis Branscomb and Richard Klausner, and was supported by 95 others on specialized panels.

The 400-page report was presented to Congress and to Governor Ridge, President Bush's choice for Director of Homeland Security in June 2002. It was published by the National Academies Press under the title "Making America Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism."

This lecture summarizes the output of this project, addresses its influence on legislation for a Department of Homeland Security, and points to the areas of public policy that require the most urgent attention. Professor Branscomb also presents his own expanded views on some issues in the report.

Link to Transcript]]> Thu, 26 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/106 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/106 Cause for War? Assessing the Bush Administration's Case Against Iraq - Part 2]]> Mon, 09 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31 Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Middle East]]> Mon, 10 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/103 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/103 ]]> Sun, 28 Apr 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/56 http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/56 ]]>